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1. ROOSEVELT'S SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS! 
Cass R. Sunstein 
On January 11, 1944, the United States was involved in its longest 
conflict since the Civil War. The war effort was going well. In a 
remarkably short period, the tide had turned sharply in favor of the Allies . 
• Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and 
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; A.B., Harvard University, 
1975; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978. Law Clerk, Justice Thurgood Marshall, U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1979-80 . 
•• Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; B.A., 
Northwestern University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977. 
1. Portions of the analysis in this section have been adapted from the 
Author's recent book, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004). 
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Ultimate victory was no longer in serious doubt. The real question was the 
nature of the peace. 
At noon, America's optimistic, aging, self-assured, wheelchair-bound 
president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, delivered his State of the Union 
Address to Congress.2 His speech was not elegant. It was messy, 
sprawling, unruly, a bit of a pastiche, and not at all literary. It was the 
opposite of Lincoln's tight, poetic Gettysburg Address. But because of 
what it said, this forgotten address, proposing a "Second Bill of Rights," 
has a strong claim to being the greatest speech of the twentieth century.3 
Roosevelt began by emphasizing that that war was a shared endeavor 
in which the United States was simply one participant: "This Nation in the 
past two years has become an active partner in the world's greatest war 
against human slavery."4 The war was in the process of being won. "But I 
do not think that any of us Americans can be content with mere survival."5 
Hence "the one supreme objective for the future" -the objective for all 
nations-was captured "in one word: Security."6 Roosevelt argued that 
the term "means not only physical security which provides safety from 
attacks by aggressors," but includes as well "economic security, social 
security, moral security."7 Roosevelt insisted that "essential to peace is a 
decent standard of living for all individual men and women and children in 
all Nations. Freedom from fear is eternally linked with freedom from 
want."8 
Moving to domestic affairs, Roosevelt emphasized the need to bring 
"security" of all kinds to America's citizens. He argued for "[a] realistic 
tax law-which will tax all unreasonable profits, both individual and 
corporate, and reduce the ultimate cost of the war to our sons and 
daughters."9 The nation "cannot be content, no matter how high that 
2. For the full version of the address, see President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32-42 (Samuel 1. Rosenman ed., Harper & Bros. 1950) 
[hereinafter Roosevelt, State of the Union Address]. 
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting Roosevelt's "Second Bill of Rights"); see generally 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 (recovering and reemphasizing Roosevelt's Second Bill of 
Rights). 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Roosevelt, State a/the Union Address, supra note 2, at 32. 
Id. 
Id. at 33. 
Id. 
Id. at 34. 
ld. at 37. 
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general standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people-whether 
it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth-is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, 
and insecure."10 At this point the speech became spectacularly ambitious. 
Roosevelt looked back, and not entirely approvingly, to the framing of the 
Constitution. At its inception, the nation had grown "under the protection 
of certain inalienable political rights-among them the right of free speech, 
free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures."l1 But over time, these rights had proved inadequate. Unlike 
the Constitution'S framers, 
[w]e have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual 
freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence .... 
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-
evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under 
which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for 
all- regardless of station, race, or creed.12 
Then he listed the relevant rights: 
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops 
or farms or mines of the Nation; 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation; 
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return 
which will give him and his family a decent living; 
The right of every businessman, large and smail, to trade in an 
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by 
monopolies at home or abroad; 
The right of every family to a decent home; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve 
and enjoy good health; 
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, 
10. Id. at 40. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 41. 
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sickness, accident, and unemployment; 
The right to a good education. 13 
Having catalogued these eight rights, Roosevelt immediately recalled 
the "one word" that captured the overriding objective for the future. He 
argued that these "rights spell security" -and hence that the recognition of 
the Second Bill was continuous with the war effort.t4 "[A]fter this war is 
won," he said, "we must be prepared to move forward, in the 
implementation of these rights. "15 There was a close connection between 
this implementation and the coming international order. "America's own 
rightful place in the world depends in large part upon how fully these and 
similar rights have been carried into practice for our citizens. For unless 
there is security here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the world."16 
He concluded that government should promote security instead of paying 
heed "to the whining demands of selfish pressure groups who seek to 
feather their nests while young Americans are dying."17 
What made the Second Bill of Rights possible? Part of the answer 
lies in a simple idea, one pervasive in the American legal culture during 
Roosevelt's time: No one really opposes government intervention. Markets 
and wealth depend on government. Without government creating and 
protecting property rights, property itself cannot exist. Even the people 
who most loudly denounce government interference depend on it every 
day. Their own rights do not come from minimizing government but are a 
product of government. Political scientist Lester Ward vividly captured the 
point: "[T]hose who denounce state intervention are the ones who most 
frequently and successfully invoke it. The cry of laissez faire mainly goes 
up from the ones who, if really 'let alone,' would instantly lose their wealth-
absorbing power."18 Think, for example, of the owner of a radio station, a 
house in the suburbs, an expensive automobile, or a large bank account. 
Every such owner depends, every day of every year, on the protection 
given by a coercive and well-funded state, equipped with a police force, 
judges, prosecutors, and an extensive body of criminal and civil law. 
13. Id. (emphasis added). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 42. 
18. LESTER WARD, PLUTOCRACY AND PATERNALISM 308 (1885), quoted in 
SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 262 (1964). 
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From the beginning, Roosevelt's White House understood all this 
quite well. In accepting the Democratic nomination in 1932, Roosevelt 
insisted that "[w]e must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not 
made by nature. They are made by human beings."19 Or consider 
Roosevelt's Commonwealth Club Address in the same year, where he 
emphasized "that the exercise of ... property rights might so interfere with 
the rights of the individual that the Government, without whose assistance 
the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy 
individualism, but to protect it. "20 The key point here is that without 
government's active assistance, property rights could not exist at all. As 
Walter Lippmann wrote in 1937: 
While the theorists were talking about laissez-faire, men were buying 
and selling legal titles to property, were chartering corporations, were 
making and enforcing contracts, were suing for damages. In these 
transactions, by means of which the work of society was carried on, the 
state was implicated at every vital point.21 
In this light it was implausible to contend that government should 
simply "stay out of the way" or "let people fend for themselves." Against 
the backdrop of the Great Depression, and the threat from fascism, 
Roosevelt was entirely prepared to insist that government should "protect 
individualism" not only by protecting property rights but also by ensuring 
decent opportunities and minimal security for all. The ultimate result was 
his proposal for the Second Bill of Rights.22 
Roosevelt, dead within fifteen months of delivering this speech, was 
unable to take serious steps toward implementing the Second Bill. But his 
proposal, largely unknown within the United States, has had an 
extraordinary influence internationally. It played a major role in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, finalized in 1948 under the 
leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt and publicly endorsed by American 
officials at the time. The Universal Declaration proclaims that 
[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
19. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Governor Accepts the Nomination for the 
Presidency (July 2, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 657 (Samuel!. Rosenman ed., 1938) [hereinafter Public Papers]. 
20. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at 
the Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 Public Papers, supra note 19, at 746. 
21. WALTER LIpPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD 
SOCIETY 187 (1937). 
22 See Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note 2. 
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and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his controL23 
The Universal Declaration also provides a right to education24 and 
social security.25 It proclaims that everyone "has a right to work, to free 
choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to 
protection against unemployment."26 
By virtue of its effect on the Universal Declaration, the Second Bill 
has influenced dozens of constitutions throughout the world. In one form 
or another, it can be found in countless political and legal documents. The 
current Constitution of Finland states that "[ e]veryone shall be guaranteed 
... the right to basic subsistence in the event of unemployment, illness, and 
disability and during old age as well as at the birth of a child or the loss of a 
provider."27 The Constitution of Spain announces, "[t]o citizens in old age, 
the public authorities shall guarantee economic sufficiency through 
adequate and periodically updated pensions."28 Similarly, the constitutions 
of Ukraine, Romania, Syria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Russia, and Peru 
recognize some or all of the social and economic rights catalogued by 
Franklin Roosevelt. We might even call the Second Bill of Rights a leading 
American export. As the most recent example, consider the interim Iraqi 
Constitution, written with American help and celebrated by the Bush 
Administration. In Article XIV, the interim Iraqi Constitution proclaims, 
"[t]he individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social 
security;" it adds that the nation and its government "shall strive to provide 
prosperity and employment opportunities to the people."29 In terms of 
constitutional thought, Article XIV can be directly traced to Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and his Second Bill of Rights. 
In fact the United States itself continues to live, at least some of the 
time, under Roosevelt's constitutional vision. A consensus underlies 
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
24. ld. at art. 26. 
25. Id. at art. 22. 
26. ld. at art. 23(1). 
27. FIN. CONST. ch. 2, § 19(2). 
28. SPAIN CON ST. tit. 1, § 2, ch. III, art. 50. 
29. IRAQ CONST. (Interim) ch. 2, art. XIV (adopted March 8, 2004), available 
at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icllizOOOOO_.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2005). 
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several of the rights he listed, including the right to education, the right to 
social security, and the right to be free from monopoly. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the Supreme Court started to go much further, embarking on a 
process of giving constitutional recognition to some of the rights that 
Roosevelt listed. The idea that the Constitution might protect social and 
economic rights can be traced to an obscure Supreme Court decision in 
194po-revealingly, the very same year as Roosevelt's "four freedoms" 
speech. California had enacted a law banning people from bringing 
indigents into the state.3! The Court ruled that the ban violated the 
commerce dause.32 States are not entitled to regulate interstate commerce, 
and if a state prohibited people from transporting the poor from one state 
to another, it was effectively regulating such commerce.33 Justice Robert 
Jackson, a close adviser to Roosevelt and his former Attorney General, 
went much further, with an emphasis on the idea of citizenship: 
"Indigence" in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying 
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color .... Property 
can have no more dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy than one who 
would make its possession a pretext for unequal or exclusive civil 
rights.34 
This passage, and especially Jackson's last sentence, could be 
understood to have far-reaching implications. In fact, Jackson was 
speaking Roosevelt's language here. In a short period from 1957 through 
1969, the Court explored several of these issues, and it reacted 
sympathetically to people's complaints. In some of them, the Court went 
so far as to hold that the government must subsidize poor people in certain 
domains. In several, the Court ruled that indigent criminal defendants 
have a right to a lawyer at taxpayer expense.35 Building on "the right to 
protect your rights," the Court struck down poll taxes.36 In other cases, the 
Court went further still. In Shapiro v. Thompson,37 the Court seemed to 
come close to saying that the Constitution conferred a right to welfare 
benefits. The case involved a Connecticut law imposing a one-year waiting 
30. Edwards Y. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
31. Id. at 171. 
32. Id. at 177. 
33. Id. at 176-77. 
34. Id. at 184-85 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
35. See, e.g., Gideon Y. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). 
36. Harper Y. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,666-69 (1966). 
37. Shapiro Y. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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period before new arrivals to the state could receive welfare benefits.38 
Obviously the state was trying to avoid becoming a magnet for poor 
people. Was this constitutional? Connecticut argued that states should 
have the right to create waiting periods to prevent fraud and to protect the 
state's taxpayers from a flood of out-of-staters hoping to get benefits.39 In 
response, those attacking the law argued that the waiting period 
discriminated against them by depriving them of the basic necessities of 
life.40 
The Court agreed. In striking down the waiting period, the Court 
relied on the constitutional right to travel.41 The waiting period would 
"penalize" impoverished travelers and thus violat.;! their constitutional 
right to go from one state to another.42 By itself, this conclusion seemed to 
raise the possibility that states might have an obligation to provide welfare 
benefits, and perhaps moderately generous benefits at that. If a state had 
no welfare programs at all, wouldn't it "penalize" travelers in just the same 
way? If a state provided welfare benefits significantly below those of their 
neighbors, might it be "penalizing" travelers too? In any case, the Court 
spoke explicitly of the special needs of poor people, suggesting that those 
needs were relevant as a constitutional matter. In the Court's words, 
Connecticut "denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the 
families to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other 
necessities of life. "43 If the decision turned only on the right to travel, this 
suggestion would seem purposeless. Thus the Court's emphasis on "food, 
shelter, and other necessities of life" seemed to be a recognition of the 
special status of at least parts of the Second Bill. The Shapiro opinion 
embodied some of Roosevelt's most dramatic claims about individual 
rights. 
The Court went even further a few years later, in Memorial Hospital 
v. Maricopa County.44 Arizona required one year's residence in the county 
as a condition for receiving nonemergency medical care at county 
expense.45 The state argued that nonemergency medical care was quite 
38. Id. at 622-23 & n.2. The case also involved similar statutes from 
Pennsylvania, see id. at 625-26 & n.5, and the District of Columbia, see id. at 623-25 & 
n.3. All three were struck down by the Court. [d. at 642. 
39. [d. at 627-28,633-34. 
40. Id. at 623-24. 
41. [d. at 629-33. 
42. Id. at 633-34. 
43. [d. at 627 (emphasis added). 
44. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
45. Id. at 252 & n.2. 
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different from "the very means to subsist"46 and that the right to travel was 
not involved.47 The Supreme Court disagreed.48 It read Shapiro as holding 
that the "denial of the basic 'necessities of life' [is] a penalty."49 In an echo 
of Roosevelt, the Court added that it is "clear that medical care is as much 
'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance."5o Thus a 
majority of the Court said that "[i]t would be odd" to conclude that a state 
must afford a poor person "welfare assistance to keep him from the 
discomfort of inadequate housing or the pangs of hunger but could deny 
him the medical care necessary to relieve him from the wheezing and 
gasping for breath that attend his illness."51 On the basis of this language, it 
would not be implausible to see the Court as suggesting that the 
Constitution requires the state to provide a degree of medical care. 
Of course these decisions did not go so far. In Shapiro and Maricopa 
County, the Court dealt with a form of discrimination. It did not say that 
the Constitution requires government to provide all citizens with a basic 
minimum. But in its 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,52 the Court issued 
an especially dramatic ruling. There it concluded that welfare benefits 
count as a kind of "new property," entitled to the protection of the 
Constitution's due process clause.53 The problem stemmed from the fact 
that New York refused to provide a full hearing before removing people 
from the welfare rolls.54 Was this constitutionally permissible? Under the 
Due Process Clause, people are entitled to a hearing only if they can show 
that their "life, liberty, or property" is at stake. But since the nation's 
beginning, welfare benefits had been seen as a mere privilege, not a right.55 
Such benefits certainly were not "liberty" or "property" within the 
meaning of the Constitution. The Court restricted the category of rights to 
the old kind of "property," such as land, cash, bank accounts, and 
investments. Government benefits were in a quite different category. Of 
course Roosevelt believed that a fair minimum should be seen as a matter 
46. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 627. 
47. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 254-55. 
48. !d. at 254-6l. 
49. Id. at 259 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 627). 
50. Id. 
5l. [d. at 259-60 (footnote omitted). 
52. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
53. [d. at 262-65 & n.8; see generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (urging the abandonment of the "rights-privileges" distinction). 
54. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 256-60. 
55. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (treating social 
security benefits as a privilege, not a right). 
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of right, not charity. But the Constitution had not been understood in 
Rooseveltian terms. To succeed, welfare recipients had to convince the 
Court to reconsider its longstanding view about the meaning of the 
Constitution. . 
In Goldberg, the Court abandoned the right-privilege distinction and 
ruled that welfare was indeed a form of constitutional "property."56 Under 
the Due Process Clause, the government must provide a hearing before it 
removes people from the rolls. In Goldberg, the Court emphasized the 
"brutal need" of those who depended on welfare benefitsY In its most 
extraordinary passage, it noted that "[f]rom its founding the Nation's basic 
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons 
within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the 
control of the poor contribute to their poverty."S8 Here is a clear reminder 
of a central lesson of the Great Depression. The Court continued: 
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring 
within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available 
to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community .... 
Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to "promote 
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity."59 
In a key footnote, the Court said "[i]t may be realistic today to regard 
welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the 
existing wealth of this country takes the form of rights that do not fall 
within traditional common-law concepts of property. "60 
By the late 1960s, respected constitutional thinkers could conclude 
that the Court was on the verge of recognizing a right to be free from 
desperate conditions-a right that captures many of the rights that 
Roosevelt attempted to catalogue. But all this was undone as a result of 
the election of President Richard Nixon in 1968. President Nixon promptly 
appointed four justices-Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, Lewis 
Powell, and Harry Blackmun - who showed no interest in the Second Bill. 
In a series of decisions, the new justices, joined by one or two others, 
rejected the claim that the existing Constitution protects the rights that 
56. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262-65 & n.8. 
57. [d. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900 (1968». 
58. [d. at 264-65 (footnote omitted). 
59. [d. at 265 (quoting U.S. CON ST. pmbl.). 
60. [d. at 262 n.8. 
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Roosevelt catalogued.61 
Roosevelt himself did not argue for constitutional change (and on this 
I believe that he was right). He wanted the Second Bill to be part of the 
nation's deepest commitments, to be recognized and vindicated by the 
public, not by federal judges. He thought that the Second Bill should be 
seen in the same way as the Declaration of Independence-as a statement 
of the fundamental aspirations of the United States, which we might see as 
the nation's constitutive commitments.62 But Roosevelt's hopes have not 
been fully realized. Much of the time, the United States seems to have 
embraced a confused and pernicious form of individualism, one that has no 
real foundations in our history. This is an approach that endorses rights of 
private property and freedom of contract, and respects political liberty, but 
claims to distrust "government intervention" and to insist that people must 
largely fend for themselves. This form of so-called individualism is 
incoherent-a hopeless tangle of confusions. As Roosevelt well knew, no 
one is really against government intervention. The wealthy, at least as 
much as the poor, receive help from government and from the benefits that 
it bestows. 
Roosevelt himself pointed to the essential problem as early as 1932. 
In his words, the exercise of "property rights might so interfere with the 
rights of the individual that the Government, without whose assistance the 
property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy 
individualism, but to protect it."63 The key phrase here is "without whose 
assistance the property rights could not exist." Those of us who are doing 
well, and who have plenty of money and opportunities, owe a great deal to 
an active government that is willing and able to protect what we have. 
Once we appreciate this point, we will find it impossible to complain about 
"government interference" as such or to urge, ludicrously, that our rights 
are best secured by getting government "off our backs." The same people 
who object to "government intervention" depend on it every day of every 
year. Roosevelt was entirely aware of this point. 
61. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 
(1973) (finding no fundamental constitutional right to education); Lindsay v. Normet, 
405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no constitutional right to social and economic 
protections, such as safe, sanitary, and decent housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (rejecting any notion of a constitutional right to welfare 
benefits). 
62. For more on this concept, see infra Parts II, IV, VI; see also SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 1, at 61-95. 
63. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at 
the Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 Public Papers, supra note 19, at 746. 
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Remarkably, the confusions that Roosevelt identified have had a 
rebirth since the early 1980s. Time and again, politicians argue that they 
oppose government intervention, even though property rights themselves 
cannot exist without such intervention. While proposing a sensible system 
of federal tax credits to increase health insurance coverage, President 
George W. Bush found it necessary to offer the senseless suggestion that 
what he was proposing was "not a government program."64 Time and 
again, American culture is said to be antagonistic to "positive rights," even 
though property rights themselves require "positive" action and even 
though the Second Bill helped capture our nation's political reforms for 
much of the twentieth century. Both at home and abroad, we are seeing a 
false and ahistorical picture of American culture and history. 
Unfortunately, that picture is far from innocuous. America's self-image-
our sense of ourselves-has a significant impact on what we actually do. 
We should not look at ourselves through a distorted mirror. 
Roosevelt was right to insist that there is an inextricable link between 
freedom from fear and freedom from want.65 Liberty and citizenship are 
rooted in security. In a sense, America lives under the Second Bill. But in 
another sense, we have lost sight of it. The Second Bill of Rights should be 
reclaimed in its nation of origin. 
[Editor's Note: As a guest blogger on the Volokh Conspiracy,66 
Professor Sunstein advanced, in abbreviated form, the argument of the 
previous essay. What resulted was a colloquy between him and Professor 
Randy Barnett on the nature and status of what Professor Sunstein calls 
"constitutive commitments." That exchange, with some editing, appears 
below, and is followed by concluding remarks by Professor Barnett written 
for the Drake Law Review.] 
64. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Health Care 
Reform, Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wis., (Feb. 11, 2002), at 
http://www . w hitehouse.gov /news/releases/2002/02f20020211-4.h tml. 
65. See Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note 2, at 34. 
66. See http://volokh.coml. 
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Cass Sunstein (guest-blogging), June 24, 2004, at 10:43 a.m.: 
II. CONSTITUTIVE COMMITMENTS 
It is standard to distinguish between constitutional requirements and 
mere policies. An appropriation for Head Start is a policy, which can be 
changed however Congress wishes; by contrast, the principle of free speech 
overrides whatever Congress seeks to do. But there is something 
important, rarely unnoticed, and in between - much firmer than mere 
policies, but falling short of constitutional requirements. These are 
constitutive commitments. (We are still talking, or at least not not talking, 
about FDR's Second Bill of Rights.) 
Constitutive commitments have a special place in the sense that they 
are widely accepted and cannot be eliminated without a fundamental 
change in national understandings. These rights are "constitutive" in the 
sense that they help to create, or to constitute, a society'S basic values. 
They are also commitments, in the sense that they have a degree of stability 
over time. A violation would amount to a kind of breach-a violation of a 
trust. 
Current examples include the right to some kind of social security 
program; the right not to be fired by a private employer because of your 
skin color or your sex; the right to protection through some kind of 
antitrust law. As with constitutional provisions, we disagree about what, 
specifically, these rights entail; but there is not much national disagreement 
about the rights themselves. (At least not at the moment.) 
We could learn a lot about a nation's history if we explored what falls 
in the category of constitutional rights, constitutive commitments, and 
mere policies-and even more if we identified migrations over time. 
Maybe some of the commitments just mentioned will turn into mere 
policies. Sometimes policies are rapidly converted into constitutive 
commitments (consider the 1964 Civil Rights Act). Sometimes constitutive 
commitments end up getting constitutional status (the right to sexual 
privacy is, to some extent, an example, with the line of cases from Griswold 
v. Connecticuf67 to Lawrence v. Texas6B). 
Back to FDR's Second Bill of Rights: He was not proposing a formal 
constitutional change; he did not want to alter a word of the founding 
document. He was proposing to identify a set of constitutive commitments. 
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
68. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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One possible advantage of that strategy is that it avoids a role for federal 
judges; another possible advantage is that it allows a lot of democratic 
debate, over time, about what the constitutive commitments specifically 
entail. 
Presidents Johnson and Reagan also tried to redefine the nation's 
constitutive commitments, but FDR was much more ambitious. He did not 
quite succeed in turning the Second Bill of Rights into constitutive 
commitments; but if you go over the list,69 you'll see that he didn't exactly 
fail. 
Randy Barnett, June 24, 2004, at 6:43 p.m.: 
III. TAKING "CONSTITUTIVE COMMITMENTS" SERIOUSLY 
In his recent post, Cass invokes the concept of a "constitutive 
commitment," by which he means something more than "a policy" and 
something less than "a constitutional requirement. "70 I take it that he 
would distinguish between constitutive commitments and Ackermanian 
ethereal unwritten constitutional amendments adopted during so-called 
"constitutional moments."71 But I am still wondering about the concept of 
"constitutive commitment" itself. 
Cass writes, "[t]hese rights are 'constitutive' in the sense that they 
help to create, or to constitute, a society's basic values."72 In a pluralist or 
diverse society (what Hayek called the "Great Society"73), however, this 
brief description of the basic idea gives rise to some obvious questions: 
who exactly is constituted by which commitments? The claim is probably 
not that everyone has made this commitment, or is constituted by it, but 
then who? A majority? A super majority? A critical mass, whether a 
majority or not? An intellectual elite? The proletariat? 
69. See Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note 2, at 41 (setting out 
the Second Bill of Rights). 
70. See supra Part II. 
71. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4-5, 17-
26, 410 (1998) (defining, identifying, and discussing "constitutional moments" as 
moments when the Constitution was, in effect, transformed through popular mandate, 
during periods such as the Reconstruction and New Deal). 
72. See supra Part II. 
73. See generally 3 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE 
MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976) 
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Assuming one of these is specified, in what manner does the 
"commitment," whatever it may be, constitute the relevant "us"? Are we 
somehow defined as individuals by a commitment external to us, or is the 
group to which be belong so defined, and "defined" in what sense? 
As a matter of political science, how does one determine the 
existence of such a commitment? Opinion polls? Opinion polls over time? 
In other words, if anything of importance turns on the existence of such a 
commitment (another question I raise below), what reliable means is there 
for ascertaining its existence, breadth and content? 
In short, how is the concept of "constitutive commitment" of an 
entire "society" less epistemically and metaphysically problematic than the 
much-maligned collective "intentions of the framers"? The serious 
problems with discerning collective group intentions are well-known. I am 
wondering how constituent commitments are any easier either to identify 
or defend as real.74 
Then there is the question of how uncontested such a commitment 
needs to be to be counted as constitutive? Does it matter that a substantial 
minority dissent? Does it matter if they do not speak up much any more 
because, however substantial in numbers, they know they are in the 
minority and would be pummeled by the majority if they did? (Think of the 
thirty to thirty-five percent of the Massachusetts electorate who are, gasp, 
Republicans. Given the stability of the Democrat majority among voters, it 
is as though these thirty to thirty-five percent do not even exist. They 
certainly lack all representation at the federal level. Would their silent 
and/or ignored dissent detract from the "constitutive commitment" of the 
majority?). 
Relatedly, how does one distinguish such a constitutive commitment 
among the general public in practice from one that "constitutes" the world 
of elite intellectual opinion makers, such as those in academia or in certain 
media outlets? Another reason why a member of even a majority of the 
general public who holds a different view from that of the opinion elite 
might remain silent is to avoid the very real suffering that can be meted out 
by this crowd with they are crossed. Someone who not as impervious to 
hostile criticism as, say, Hootie Johnson or Richard Epstein - which 
describes most people I think-is likely to remain silent even when their 
74. To be clear, I reject an "original intent" approach to constitutional 
interpretation in favor of an "original meaning" approach that is based on the public 
meaning of the words used at the time of their enactment. See RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89-117 (2003). 
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views are shared by a "silent majority" of the public. How do we detect 
this phenomenon in assessing the existence of a constitutive commitment? 
What turns on the existence of a constitutive commitment? That 
those who share it vote or act in certain ways? That the minority who 
dissent remain silent or acquiesce in some way? That legislators vote in 
certain ways? Cass says that one advantage of FDR's constitutive 
commitment "strategy is that it avoids a role for federal judges, "75 so I 
assume judicial review is more or less out of the picture, which 
distinguishes a constitutive commitment from an Ackermanian unwritten 
amendment. But perhaps I am misconstruing him here. I guess this is the 
eternal "so what?" faculty workshop question that I normally avoid asking. 
Speaking of avoidance, is there any way of avoiding the sense that 
someone who invokes the concept of constitutive commitment is trying 
somehow to elevate, privilege or reify his or her own commitments or 
moral judgments-giving these judgments some higher status in the 
General Will of the Community, rather than that of a mere moral 
jUdgment, or even that of a mere consensus or a majority view? 
All this does seem to relate to Cass's invocation of a Second Bill of 
Rights. When he first posted, I had thought to inquire as to the sense in 
which these claims are "rights." I was going to ask whether they are 
natural rights that belong to persons regardless of whether recognized by 
government-like the freedom of speech. Or are they positive rights that 
exist because they are adopted as part of the human laws-like the right to 
a jury trial. As James Madison explained, the original ten amendments 
included both of these two types, though I have concluded that the Ninth 
Amendment refers only to natural rights.76 But it now appears that Cass 
75. See supra Part II. 
76. In Madison's notes for his speech to the House proposing his version of a 
bill of rights, he categorizes the "Contents of Bill of Rhts." Under this heading he 
distinguishes between "3. Natural rights retained as speach" and "4. positive rights 
resultg. as trial by jury." James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed 
Amendments and His Notes for the Amendment Speech, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY 
THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 51, 64 (Randy 
E. Barnett ed., 1989) [hereinafter BARNETT, RIGHTS RETAINED]. In the published 
account of his delivered speech Madison elaborates on the latter category: "In other 
instances, they specify positive rights, which may result from the nature of the 
compact." He then elaborates on the example given in his notes: "Trial by jury cannot 
be considered a natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact which 
regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the 
people as anyone of the pre-existent rights of nature." 1 THE DEBATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 454 (Joseph Gales & William 
Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison). In addition to establishing the 
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means to claim Roosevelt's list, or some portion thereof, as "constitutive 
commitments," which are neither natural rights nor positive rights, thereby 
making a more precise account of this type of animal (or is it vegetable?) 
important to assessing the exact nature of his current argument. 
Cass Sunstein (guest-blogging), June 25,2004, at 11:24 a.m.: 
IV. TAKING FDR SERIOUSLY 
Thanks to Randy Barnett, and assorted emailers, for excellent 
questions and comments about constitutive commitments and FDR's 
Second Bill of Rights. Constitutive commitments first: They are not part 
of the formal constitution and they are certainly not for judicial 
enforcement. They nonetheless matter, because they have sufficiently wide 
and deep political support that they are effectively binding-unless and 
until there is a major transformation in public values. 
It would be nice to have a clear sense of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for constitutive commitments, but lacking these, let's make a 
rough first cut: A constitutive commitment is in place if over a significant 
period of time, a presidential candidate could not seriously question that 
commitment without essentially disqualifying himself. This means that the 
commitment must have both wide and deep support (and not just among 
academics, elites, or the media; a strong political majority is needed). We 
can imagine hard intermediate cases and the definition leaves ambiguities; 
but the prohibition on racial discrimination in employment, the antitrust 
laws, and some kind of social security program are evident examples-and 
so too, I think, with a ban on the nationalization of industries and on 
federal taxes above a certain rate (e.g., Kennedy-era levels). Any nation 
will have some constitutive commitments that some reasonable people will 
reject; and reasonable people sometimes get those commitments to change 
distinction between natural and positive rights, this passage in Madison's notes is also 
significant evidence that the rights "retained by the people" to which the Ninth 
Amendment refers are natural liberty rights, rather than positive rights. Another vital 
piece of evidence is a draft of a bill of rights written by Representative Roger Sherman 
who served with Madison on the House select committee to draft a bill of rights. 
Sherman's proposed second amendment begins: "The people have certain natural 
rights which are retained by them when they enter into Society .... " Roger Sherman's 
Draft of a Bill of Rights, in BARNETT, RIGHTS RETAINED, app. A, at 351 (emphasis 
added). For other evidence that "retained rights" was a reference to natural rights and 
that "natural rights" meant liberty rights, see BARNETT, supra note 74, at 54-60. 
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over time. 
In the sense in which FDR meant his Second Bill to contain "rights": 
He was not much of a theorist (Trotsky famously criticized him for just that 
reason: "Your President abhors 'systems' and 'generalities"'77), and he saw 
(positive, in the sense of legally protected) rights as instruments for 
protecting the most important human interests. Randy asks whether the 
Second Bill should be seen as protecting "natural rights."78 To say the 
least, the natural rights tradition has multiple strands; a good contemporary 
version is elaborated by Amartya Sen,79 A possible position: if we believe 
that human beings have certain rights by virtue of their humanity, it is 
plausible to say that those rights include a decent chance to achieve well-
being by their own rights and also a minimal level of security if, for one or 
another reason (e.g., disability, illness, atrocious luck), that chance is not 
enough. Roosevelt's focus was on decent opportunities and minimal 
security, and while his Second Bill of Rights was an innovation, he can 
claim clear antecedents in Montesquieu, Blackstone, and even Madison. 
Randy Barnett, June 25,2004, at 12:49 p.m.: 
V. WHY DO "CONSTITUTIVE COMMITMENTS" MATTER? 
I believe that Cass is describing a very real social phenomenon. 
There surely are, and have always been, some positions or "norms" that 
are sufficiently "beyond the mainstream" as to disqualify someone from 
national office. These norms are "effectively binding"80 in the sense that 
one publicly disavows them at one's peril. While these norms remain 
stable over time, they can also be contested and eventually supplanted. All 
this sounds perfectly reasonable and plausible as a description of social 
norms, but I am still left wondering: 
(a) In what sense is such a norm accurately described as a 
"commitment"; 
(b) In what sense is such a norm "constitutive"; 
(c) What argumentative purpose is served by invoking the concept 
77. Leon Trotsky, If America Should Go Communist, LIBERTY, Mar. 23, 1935, 
available at http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/sepcOllsepL01_12.html. 
7S. See supra Part III. 
79. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). 
so. See supra Part IV. 
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of "constitutive commitment"? That is, what does it add to otherwise 
familiar normative or descriptive claims about rights, law, justice, etc.? 
Clarifying these three matters would go a long way to helping me better 
understand the normative and/or descriptive claim Cass is making about 
the Second Bill of Rights. 
Cass Sunstein (guest-blogging), June 26, 2004, at 11:34 a.m.: 
VI. FDR's INCOMPLETE SUCCESS 
With or without written constitutions, all nations have constitutive 
commitments, some codified in some form, others just widely understood 
as such. Randy Barnett asks, rightly, the sense in which these are 
"commitments" and "constitutive."81 They are commitments in the sense 
that they are taken (politically, that is) to be binding, and not to be subject 
to change with the political winds. The United States is firmly committed 
to some kind of social security program, in a way that it is not committed to 
particular appropriations, or the Toxic Substances Control Act, or Head 
Start, or Americorps, or the Superfund statute. These commitments are 
"constitutive" in the sense that they help define, and hence constitute, the 
nation's self-understanding. The self-understanding of the United States 
would not allow it to accept a proposal to nationalize the automobile 
industry or to repeal the laws forbidding racial discrimination by private 
employers. (If you do not like these examples, choose your own; there are 
many other possibilities.) 
The idea of constitutive commitments does not serve an 
argumentative purpose, so far as I can tell, but it might help illuminate a 
nation's political and even legal culture as it changes over time. It might 
also help clarify what particular debates are really about. In 1970, the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program lacked 
constitutional status, but it was a constitutive commitment, and some 
judicial decisions appeared to be influenced by that fact (the decisions 
involved statutory interpretation, not constitutional law). By 1990, the 
AFDC program was a mere policy. Changes in the other direction are also 
common; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has probably moved, 
in a short time, into the category of the constitutive commitment (not its 
particular provisions, but the general idea). 
81. See supra Parts III, V. 
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FDR wanted the Second Bill of Rights to stand as a constitutive 
commitment. While it would be wrong to say he failed, he did not really 
succeed. The nation is committed, at least in principle, to some of the 
rights he listed (e.g., the right to free from domination by monopolies) but 
not to others (including my least favorite, the farmers' rights provision, 
which fits uneasily with the right to be free from domination by 
monopolies). 
Thanks much to Eugene for the forum, and to emailers for the many 
excellent ~omments, criticisms, and suggestions; I've learned a lot. 
VII. CONSTITUTIVE COMMITMENTS Do NOT MA TIER, 
BUT IF THEY Do ... 
Randy E. Barnett 
The online exchange between my friend Cass Sunstein and me reveals 
a wonderful feature of blogging that largely does not exist in academic 
discourse. The normal exchange in a faculty workshop, for example, would 
be for an author like Cass to present a paper, and then be subjected to 
questions from the professors in attendance. I might get in the queue and 
ask the first of my questions above in a very truncated fashion, and Cass 
would respond. In some circumstances I might be permitted a follow up 
but it would be considered rude to extend the dialogue between us any 
farther. Even in normal law review pUblications, I might be permitted a 
comment on Cass's original essay, to which he would be given the 
opportunity to respond. That would be the end of the dialogue. 
But by undertaking to blog, Cass implicitly committed himself to 
answering a series of questions that might be put to him. Perhaps 
"commitment" is not the right term, but provided my questions were fair 
and appropriate, any failure on his part to respond would have been taken 
by the audience as an abdication of his self-assumed duty to engage in the 
discourse of the blog. And Cass proceeded to uphold his commitment until 
his time as guest blogger ran out. 
As a result, I believe we learned something that we otherwise might 
never have known about his provocative Essay, which summarizes the 
thesis of his provocative new book.82 What we learned is that constitutive 
82. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1. 
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commitments do not matter. Ok, well that may be a bit hyperbolic. What I 
mean is that, as further explained by Cass in our exchange, a constitutive 
comment is purely descriptive of a kind of general attitude in the body 
politic. I think the questioning also made clear how difficult it is to 
understand the nature of this attitude so that it can be detected by purely 
descriptive techniques. Whether or not they can be accurately identified, 
however, this attitude appears to have no normative bite. The existence of 
a constitutive commitment adds nothing to normative discourse over what 
our basic political commitments ought to be, which is what normal political 
discourse is all about. . 
In his final blog entry, Cass writes, tellingly I think: "The idea of 
constitutive commitments does not serve an argumentative purpose, so far 
as I can tell, but it might help illuminate a nation's political and even legal 
culture as it changes over time."83 And so it might. What it will not do is 
add anything to normative discourse over what rights people have that are 
worthy of government respect. The assertion of a constitutive commitment 
amounts to the very conventional claim that " ... and lots of people agree 
with me!" Of course, having lots of people agree with one's position may 
add some plausibility to one's normative claims. Sometimes such a claim 
establishes a baseline of agreement between members of a conversation 
that enables them to move on to other more contested matters. ("We both 
agree about X, so what we must really be disagreeing about is Y."). But 
such a claim does next to nothing to resolve any normative challenge to the 
descriptive claim being made by the speaker. It is largely bootstrapping. 
Suppose I deny that there is a natural right to a decent home, by 
which I mean that one person has no enforceable moral claim on another 
person, or group of persons, to provide him with a house. Classical natural 
rights thinkers distinguished between "perfect rights" which ought to be 
enforceable and "imperfect rights" which entail unenforceable moral 
duties. By denying that there is a perfect right to a house, I would not be 
denying that some persons could decide to give a portion of their property 
to others so that they may afford a house. Likewise, a government 
program could be created to provide housing by means of tax dollars 
(unless taxation itself is theft, in which case such a program would be 
unjust for that reason). The denial of the alleged "right" to a home would 
be denying only that, in the absence of government, one person can 
demand that another person be compelled to labor for him to build him a 
house. What policies government chooses to adopt, even in the absence of 
an enforceable moral claim, is another matter. 
83. See supra Part VI. 
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Supposing that it is possible to identify the constitutive commitments 
of an entire society of 280 million diverse persons and that it matters what 
these commitments may be, the particular constitutive commitments 
emphasized by Cass are highly contestable. First, the exact content of the 
alleged commitment is contestable - for example, is a commitment to an 
enforceable or "perfect right" of the poor to the assistance of others, or a 
commitment to voluntarily honor an unenforceable duty or "imperfect 
right" to provide assistance to those in need by means of a voluntary public 
program? As a purely descriptive matter, it seems that it is the latter, not 
the former, that has "real foundations in our history,"84 but who can be 
sure? And how could this interpretive dispute about unwritten constitutive 
commitments ever be settled? That is the point of my doubts about the 
uncertain conditions of what makes a commitment constitutive and how we 
would know one if it existed. 
Second, assuming there are such things as constitutive commitments, 
it is not at all clear that ours today are the same as those in Roosevelt's day. 
In the 1940s, the idea of a national welfare state had great appeal among 
intellectuals. It promised a more effective means to achieve the liberal 
ends of individual well-being. Then it was tried. Remember "The Great 
Society" with its "War on Poverty" and "Urban Renewal," which was 
initiated during the Johnson Administration and greatly expanded by 
Richard Nixon (who also added the "War on Drugs" to the program)? Did 
poverty end? Were cities restored to their previous greatness? Was illicit 
drug use eradicated? Well, no. The underclass expanded as more people 
came to rely on government benefits as "entitlements." The inner cities 
grew more impoverished and dangerous. Government housing projects 
were erected and fell into the control of gangs and thugs, and are now 
being demolished. Government schools declined precipitously. Stagflation 
hit the national economy. The War on Drugs has fueled inner city street 
gangs and international terrorist organizations, and undermined democracy 
in Third World countries.85 
All these pernicious effects of implementing something like 
Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights are the reasons why "welfare state" is 
now an epithet rather than a noble goal. Why courts in the 1980s backed 
84. See supra Part I. 
85. While Cass may object to the War on Drugs being added to the Second 
Bill of Rights, it appears to be as much an unquestioned political stance-and hence a 
constitutive commitment-as any other item on Roosevelt's list. For an introduction 
to the perniciousness of this governmental policy, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Bad 
Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L. J. 2593 (1994). 
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away from imposing these policies as constitutional rights. Why Ronald 
Reagan was elected in 1980. Why Republicans took control of the House 
of Representatives in 1994, ending 50 years of Democratic dominance. 
Why all three branches of government are now controlled by Republicans. 
Why European social welfare states, all built on Rooseveltian foundations, 
are in grave economic crisis, with intractably high unemployment and 
obligations to pay for social programs outstripping the ability to tax those 
who work. 
In short, our real world experience since the 1940s undermined any 
"constitutive commitment" that may have existed to a Second Bill of 
Rights in a manner that no academic argument ever could. But academic 
arguments explaining theoretically why Roosevelt's approach leads to 
disastrous consequences have also boomed since his speech, beginning with 
the explosive popularity of F.A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom in 1949.86 If 
forced to choose whether the vision of Roosevelt or of Hayek is ascendant, 
I think clearly it is the latter. How could Cass prove me wrong? 
Does a rejection of the Second Bill of Rights entail a return to a 
ruthless, Social Darwinist, atomistic individualism? No. First, because 
ruthless, Social Darwinist, atomistic individualism was always a straw man 
against which Progressives loved to tilt. Classical liberals committed to 
private property rights and freedom of contract as the twin engines of 
liberty and prosperity never justified their commitment on grounds of 
atomistic individualism. Rather, from before Adam Smith they justified 
these fundamental rights on the ground that human beings were highly 
both dependent on each other and vulnerable. Properly defined property 
rights served to protect the individual from the more powerful group, and 
freedom of contact provided the most effective means of obtaining the 
support of others.8? In a crucial passage of his Lectures on Jurisprudence,88 
Adam Smith wrote: 
Man continually standing in need of the assistance of others, must fall 
upon some means to procure their help. This he does not merely by 
coaxing and courting; he does not expect it unless he can turn it to your 
86. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
87. For a more comprehensive defense of the classical liberal natural rights of 
several property, freedom of contract, first possession, restitution, and self defense as 
necessary to address the pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest and power, 
see generally RANDY E. BARNETI, THE STRUcruRE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (1998). 
88. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 
1978). 
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advantage or make it appear to be so. Mere love is not sufficient for it, 
till he applies in some way to your self love. A bargain does this in the 
easiest manner.89 
As for Social Darwinism, at one time it was a very popular "scientific" 
theory among all the intelligentsia including, most notably, Progressives 
themselves.90But that is a story for another day. 
Nor were classical liberals somehow confused, as Cass seems to 
think,91 about the need for government to "positively" enforce properly 
defined natural rights of property and contract, when they opposed 
governmental interference with these rights. Indeed, the purpose for 
making claims of perfect rights is as much to justify government protection 
of these rights as it is to deny government the power to interfere with their 
proper exercise. That the first duty of government is the equal protection 
of properly defined rights was always at the heart of the Lockean 
justification of government itself.92 That government is thought to be 
needed to enforce properly defined rights, therefore, provides no support 
whatsoever for extending governmental enforcement to rights claims that 
themselves interfere with properly defined rights. 
So what then are our "constitutive commitments" today? Today 
more than any time since the nineteenth century, American culture is 
committed to rights of private property and freedom of contract. It is 
against this intellectual tide that Cass Sunstein makes his plea, asserting 
Rooseveltian constitutive commitments as a sort of rear guard action. But 
this American commitment to property and contract is tempered by the 
age-old classical liberal concern with the welfare of those who slip between 
the cracks-the group that used to be called the "deserving poor." 
True, today most still accept the Progressive proposition that 
government rather than private institutions should assist these people. 
Nevertheless, most also complain that the nondeserving poor are assisted 
as well as those who deserve aid, a complaint that led to historic welfare 
reforms in the 1990s. I believe both the deserving poor and the greater 
society would be better served if more of this well-motivated assistance 
89. Id. at 347-48 (Glasgow Univ. Lecture, Tuesday, Mar. 29, 1763). 
90. See, for example, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) in which the 
Progressive hero, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote that "[t]hree generations 
of imbeciles are enough." [d. at 207. 
91. See supra Part I. 
92. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507,512-20 (1991). 
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were channeled through private competitive institutions, as it once was.93 
Time will tell whether we will move farther in this direction or be frozen in 
place. 
But the proof of the pudding is in the eating. To the extent it matters, 
Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights was abandoned as a constitutive 
commitment-if it was ever truly adopted-by the bitter taste of the Great 
Society. If increased reliance on the voluntary duty of beneficence is 
allowed by the political establishment to be tried and it proves to work 
better in practice than government welfare programs, as theory says that it 
should, then such an approach is likely to expand. The principal obstacle 
to discovering who is correct as a practical matter is the effective 
obstruction of these reforms by reactionaries in academia, the media and 
public sector unions who call themselves, ironically, "Progressives." In the 
end, individual liberty is the one continuous constitutive commitment of 
the American polity. Only time will tell whether the best means to that 
end is Roosevelt's or Hayek's. I know on whom my bet would be placed. 
93. See generally DAVID T. BEITO, FROM MUTUAL AID TO THE WELFARE 
STATE: FRATERNAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 1890-1967 (2000). 
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